NOTES I Cannot Tell a Lie: The Standard for New Trial in False Testimony Cases
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the trial court to grant a new trial to a defendant when "required in the interest of justice." 1 When rule 33 motions for a new trial are based upon newly discovered evidence,2 judges have exercised their discretion with great caution. 3 Their reluctance to grant new trials on the basis of newly discovered evidence reflects the legitimate interest in protecting the finality of judgments.
4 Because of the great importance 1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 states: The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if required in the interest of justice. If trial was by the court without a jury the court on motion of a defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. Courts have recognized that rule 33 places new trial decisions within the trial judge's discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370 , 1373 (5th Cir. 1977 (citing Hudson v. United States, 387 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1976) ). The trial court's ruling will be reversed on review only if the trial judge abused or failed to exercise his discretion. See United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017 , 1019 (1st Cir. 1980 ; United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370 , 1373 (5th Cir. 1977 ; United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290 , 1292 (3d Cir. 1976 ); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1974 ), cen. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975 ; United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 1972) . In practice, the trial judge's ruling will stand unless his findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 112 (1946) ; United States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1278 , 1279 (4th Cir. 1973 ) (per curiam); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 990 (1st Cir.) , cert denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971) .
2. See generally United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1980 ; United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1979) , cert denied, 445 U. S. 942 (1980) ; United States v. Robinson, 585 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1978) , cert denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979) ; United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir.) , cert denied, 434 U. S. 959 (1977) ; United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975 ), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 819 (1976 ; United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1973 ); 8A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ~ 33.04 [1] (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as 8A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]; Annot., 59 A.L.R. FED. 657 (1982) (in which courts and commentators have discussed the issue of when it is appropriate for a trial judge to grant a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence). When this Note uses the term "newly discovered evidence cases," it refers to newly discovered evidence cases generally; when it uses the term "false testimony cases," it refers only to those cases in which newly discovered evidence uncovers false trial testimony.
3. United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370, 1373 (5th Cir. i977) (citing United States v. Riley, 544 F.2d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1976) ); United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Austin, 387 F. Supp. 540, 542 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (citing United States v. Lombardozzi, 343 F.2d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 1965 ), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 (1965 ). See also United States v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 583, 595 (E.D. Mich. 1979 ) (motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are "seldom granted") (citing United States v. Gamer, 529 F.2d 962, 969 (6th Cir. 1976 ), ajfd., 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1980 ), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981 ).
4. See United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 819 1925 [Vol. 83:1925 accorded this interest, the vast majority of courts have steadfastly adhered to the long-established rule that newly discovered evidence will not entitle the accused to a new trial unless that evidence would probably produce a different verdict. 5 Recognizing, however, that the integrity of the judicial process depends not only upon the finality of judgments but also upon fairness to criminal defendants, courts have lowered the standard for retrial in certain situations. 6 One exception to the application of the probability standard arises when newly discovered evidence suggests that a government witness testified falsely at trial. 7 In this situation, most courts (1976) ; United States ex rel Rice v. Vincent, 491 F.2d 1326 , 1332 (2d Cir. 1974 ), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974 ; United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954); Criminal Law & Procedure -Ninth Circuit Adopts Berry Standard For New Trial Based Upon Perjured Testi• mony, 11 GOLDEN GATE 171, 174 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Law & Procedure] , The interest in finality is founded upon the notion of judicial economy. Trial courts rarely grant motions for new trial where a costly retrial would be unlikely to produce a different outcome. In Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961) , cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964) , the court stated:
[W]here the conduct of the trial has been less censurable, or not censurable at all, a greater showing of prejudice is demanded, because the interest in obtaining an ideal trial, with the trier of the facts considering all admissible evidence that has ever become available, and nothing else, is not thus supplemented and may be outweighed by the interest in avoiding a retrial unlikely to have a different outcome -an interest especially weighty when, as is normally true on collateral attack, the second trial will come long after the first. Appellate courts are reluctant to disturb the findings of trial courts on motions for new trial in deference to the "orderly administration of criminal justice." United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111 (1946) ; United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401,403 (2d Cir. 1954) . Because trial courts are better qualified to assess the impact of conflicting evidence, appellate courts will not intervene unless the factual findings of the trial court are not supported by any evidence. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. at 111, 112.
5. Berry v. Georgia, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851) . In Berry, the Georgia Supreme Court first set forth the probability standard for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Almost nil courts still apply the Berry rule to rule 33 motions for retrial based on newly discovered evidence. To succeed under Berry a defendant must show (a) that the evidence was unknown to him at the time of trial; (b) that the failure to discover the evidence was not due to lack of due diligence; (c) that the new evidence is neither cumulative nor impeaching; (d) that the new evidence would probably produce an acquittal. See, e.g., United States v. Street, 570 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Frye, 548 F.2d 769 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290 , 1292 (3d Cir. 1976 United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975 ), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976 ; United States v. Bertone, 249 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1957) ; SA MOORE'S FED· ERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 1f 33.04 [1] .
6. Typically, these cases have involved a certain degree of prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, where the prosecutor has suppressed material evidence favorable to the accused, the Supreme Court has ruled that due process mandates a new trial irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor. United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985) ; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) . Where the prosecutor has knowledge that testimony by a government witness is false and fails to reveal that information, reversal of a criminal conviction is virtually automatic.
United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975 ), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976 . See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 797-98 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ; notes 46-48 infra and accompanying text. The standard for retrial is also lower when the prosecutor did not actually know of the perjury but should have known of it. Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150 (1972) .
7. This Note uses the term "false testimony cases" to describe situations involving no demon• strated prosecutorial misconduct in which newly discovered evidence suggests that a witness testified falsely at trial. False testimony includes testimony that is either deliberately or inadvertantly false. See State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 587 (Minn. 1982) This Note examines the question of what standard should be used for granting a new trial when a defendant's conviction is alleged to have been based, at least in part, on false testimony. Part I demonstrates the failure of the existing standards to strike a satisfactory balance between defendants' rights and the efficient administration of the criminal justice system. Part II argues that motions for retrial based upon false testimony should be governed by a standard drawn not only from newly discovered evidence cases generally, but also from cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, Part III suggests that the proper test for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence of false testimony is whether there is a significant chance that a jury with knowledge of false testimony would avoid conviction. This test both guards against convictions based upon false testimony and preserves the finality of judgments necessary for the sound and efficient administration of criminal justice. A proper balance between these often competing goals will enhance the interests of justice that rule 33 is designed to protect.
witness' state of mind" should not "be the factor that determines whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial"); Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir.) (stating that "the duty of a trial court to grant a new trial" includes situations in which the witness "was mistaken in his testimony"), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927) . See also Carlson, False or Suppressed Evidence: Why a Need for the Prosecutoria/ Tie?, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1171 , 1186 n.42 (1969 (arguing that as a practical matter, all false testimony should be treated alike since the evidentiary problem in proving perjury may be difficult or impossible to overcome). But see United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 989-90 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 597-98 (Minn. 1982) (Peterson, J., dissenting). 8. 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928 2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979 2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980 United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 246 (2d Cir. 1975 ), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 819 (1976 . One circuit has failed to express an opinion as to whether the probability or the might standard should be applied to cases involving perjured testimony. United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977) . [Vol. 83:1925 
I. CRITICISM OF EXISTING STANDARDS
The standards currently used in ruling on motions for retrial based upon false testimony fail to strike an acceptable balance between the rights of the accused and the demand for efficient administration of the criminal justice system in federal courts. The Larrison standard is prone to inconsistent application and disregards witness credibility in the determination of whether a jury would have reached a different verdict. The probability standard is capable of more consistent application but, in its deference to judicial economy, sacrifices the rights of some defendants who would have had a significant chance of acquittal or a hung jury on retrial.
A. The Larrison Standard
In Larrison, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a new trial should be granted when each of three conditions are met:
(a) The court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false.
(b) That without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion.
(c) That the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial. 11
The first prong of the Larrison test unfairly disadvantages defendants because it fails to provide for retrial even when a material witness is totally discredited. Because the test initially requires that the trial court be "reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a mate-11. Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928 ) (emphasis in original). Analysis of the third prong of the Larrison test -"that the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise" -is beyond the scope of this Note. Detailed examination of this requirement is unnecessary since there is little controversy surrounding it. The requirement that the defense must exercise "due diligence" exists in cases governed by both the Larrison and the Berry rule. See United States v. Robinson, 585 F.2d 274, 278-79 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1978); United States v. Becker, 466 F.2d 886, 889-90 (7th Cir. 1972 ), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973 ; United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 937 (1958) ; United States v. Flynn, 131 F. Supp. 742, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1955 ). This condition is related to the efficient administration of justice. See note 4 supra. If the lack of due diligence on the part of defense counsel is of such significance as to deny the accused a fair trial, the defendant may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984) .
One commentator has noted that the due diligence requirement of Larrison actually adds very little to the test:
An additional test for a recantation is said to be whether the defendant was surprised by the testimony and unable to meet it. This seems to be no more than an extension of the probability-of-acquittal test. That is, if defendant was able to meet the testimony (e.g., by impeaching the witness), it can hardly be claimed that the recantation might result in a different verdict.
SA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 11 33.05. Moore's analysis can be empirically verified. Of the 50 cases surveyed in which the Larrison test was employed, there was not a single case in which a motion for retrial was denied solely because of the defendant's failure to show he was taken by surprise.
rial witness is false," 12 retrials may be denied when judges are unable reasonably to determine whether a witness was, in fact, telling the truth. 13 Such confusion frequently occurs when the inherently suspect testimony of an accomplice witness 14 is followed by an equally suspect recantation. 15 The witness may be thoroughly discredited at this point, but the defendant will not be entitled to a new trial under the Larrison test. 16 [Vol. 83:1925 The 237, 245 (2d Cir. 1975 237, 245 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976 , explaining that, under the La"ison standard, reversal would be required:
in cases of perjury with respect to even minor matters, especially in light of the standard jury instruction that upon finding that a witness had deliberately proffered false testimony in part, the jury may disregard his entire testimony. Thus, once it is shown that a material witness has intentionally lied with respect to any matter, it is difficult to deny that the jury, had it known of the lie, "might have acquitted." 157, 158 (D.N.J. 1962) . Moreover, because these decisions are typically recorded at the appellate level and the standard for review at that level is extremely deferential, see note 1 supra, these results would tend to underestimate the number of retrials actually granted under Larrison at the trial court level. Second, the Larrison standard is not necessarily circumvented every time a court makes a finding that there is no perjury. The greater likelihood is that in a substantial number of cases the judge had good reason to believe that the recantation itself was false. See note 15 supra. Finally, as already indicated, because the La"ison standard provides no guidelines for dealing with the effect on a jury of a discredited witness, it is extremely difficult for the defense to prove falsity in the first place. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. States v. Garrison, 192 F. Supp. 195, 197 (E.D. Wis. 1961 ) (Larrison test not met where "alleg- [Vol. 83:1925 ness and inconsistent application render the Lallison standard an unreliable guide for new trial decisions.
See also
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the Lallison test is that it does not require consideration of the effect that knowledge of perjury would have had on a jury's evaluation of the witness's credibility. 22 The Larrison test requires a showing that the verdict might have been different had the false testimony simply not been in the record in the previous trial. 23 The false testimony is thus considered only for its probative impact on the factual elements of the prosecution's case. 24 The existence of false testimony is equally germane, however, to the credibility of the government's witness. 25 In cases in which the defense documents that a government witness has perjured a portion of his pertiedly false testimony concerns minor details not material to the guilt of the defendants"), ajf d., 296 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1961 Cir. ), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 804 (1962 .
22. See Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 246; Criminal Law & Procedure, supra note 4, at 178. The language of the test itself seems to suggest that the appellate court is to assume that the jury did not have knowledge of the perjury since the test looks to the original trial and asks what verdict the jury would have reached without the perjured testimony. Some courts, however, have modi- On an ordinary motion for new trial, the court is concerned with the probable effect which the newly discovered evidence might have upon another trial. In contrast, where the motion is based on false swearing, the concern of the court must be as to the probable effect produced on the trial already had. In the former case, the court looks to the future, in the latter case to the past, and the sole question is whether the defendants' right to a fair and impartial trial has been prejudiced by reason of the false testimony.
24. See note 22 supra. If the court is doing no more than analyzing the previous trial for prejudice, all it need do is remove the factor that caused the jury's verdict to be prejudiced, in this case the perjured testimony. It need not take the additional step of injecting the entirely new element of witness credibility. v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1945) , revd. on other grounds, 327 U. S. 106 (1946) , the first decision stating that the sole concern in false testimony cases is the effect of the false swearing on the original jury, the court also quoted Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir. 1927) , to support the proposition that because of the effect of the perjury on the witness's credibility at "a new trial there would be a strong circum• stance in favor of the losing party that did not exist ... at the time of the original trial." (emphasis added). Both fairness and efficiency suggest strong reasons for looking at the potential effect of the new evidence on retrial. In fairness terms, the credibility of the witness may have been the key factor that led the jury to convict. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959) ; United States v. Atkinson, 429 F. Supp. 880, 885 (E.D.N.C. 1977) . In efficiency terms, it makes more sense to ask whether a new trial would make any difference rather than to have retrials every time a prosecution witness's perjury caused some degree of prejudice no matter how frivolous. But cf United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1979) , in which the Ninth Circuit was unable to see "any practical difference" between the previous trial and a new trial in evaluat-nent testimony, it would be unfair to the defendant to consider the remainder of the witness's testimony unimpeached. Indeed, the jury's assessment of witness credibility may ultimately determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. 26 
It is ironic that in United States

B. The Stofsky Test
In United States v. Stofsky, 27 the Second Circuit rejected the Larrison standard for new trial in false testimony cases in favor of the probability-of-acquittal standard traditionally applied in newly discovered evidence cases. Under the probability test, retrial will be granted only when the new evidence is so material that it "probably" would produce a different verdict at the new trial. 28 The Stofsky court found that the probability test would allow courts to "act forthrightly" and would result in fewer retrials than the might test. 29 In addition, unlike the Larrison test, the Stofsky standard properly focuses on the effect that evidence of perjury has on witness credibility as well as on the factual elements of the government's case. 30 ing the weight of perjured testimony. This observation only has merit, however, if the effect of the perjured testimony on witness credibility is considered in both cases.
26 Cir. 1929 ). The slight difference in wording between "probably produce an acquittal" and "probably produce a different verdict" is most likely not intended to have any effect on the applicable standard of review. What the difference does reflect, however, is an obvious confusion on the part of the courts as to whether the test is to be measured against a twelve-juror standard or a hung-jury standard. Given the extreme difficulty of predicting how a jury will react whenever any new evidence is introduced, one wonders whether such subtle distinctions really make any difference in practice. Another problem that does not appear to have been the subject of explicit reported judicial consideration, at least in this circuit, is whether, in considering a motion for a new trial on [Vol. 83:1925 Despite these apparent improvements over the Larrison test, there are good reasons for viewing the Stofsky test with skepticism. First, by placing disproportionate emphasis on efficient judicial administration, the probability test may deprive defendants of their constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. 31 Since the test denies retrial to defendants with improbable yet significant chances of acquittal, 32 many defendants will be convicted on the basis of false testimony. A trial that results in conviction on the basis of false testimony may be so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process. 33 Thus, grounds of perjury, the court should assume that the jury would have had before it the newly-discovered evidence not only for its probative value with respect to the issues but also to demonstrate that the witness had perjured himself with respect to that evidence, the latter being pertinent, of course, for its impeaching value. Put another way, should we, in determining whether truthful testimony by the witness would probably have changed the jury's verdict, also assume that the jury would have known that he had lied under oath about the matter? Since the witness's credibility could very well have been a factor of central importance to the jury, indeed every bit as important as the factual elements of the crime itself, • . . we would answer this question in the affirmative. Upon discovery of previous trial perjury by a government witness, the court should decide whether the jury probably would have altered its verdict if it had had the opportunity to appraise the impact of the newlydiscovered evidence not only upon the factual elements of the government's case but also upon the credibility of the government's witness. 527 F.2d at 246 (citations omitted).
31. The concept of due process set forth in the fifth amendment and extended to the states by the fourteenth amendment includes more than merely notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) . Due process "embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." 294 U.S. at 112. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) .
32. If, as the Stofsky court argued, a literal application of the might standard would make retrials virtually automatic, then it may be argued with equal force that a literal application of the probability standard would deny retrials to defendants whenever a judge determined there was a 50% or lower chance of acquittal at a new trial. Thus, convictions may be upheld even where defendants have a significant chance of acquittal. The meaning of "significant" in this context is not a precise mathematical figure that can be empirically verified. Instead, what is meant is a common sense or intuitive judgment that the chances that the innocent will be made to suffer are simply too high to tolerate. 33. Although intuitively it might seem that convictions based even in part on perjured testimony are fundamentally unfair and, therefore, implicate due process concerns, this is not the majority view. See United States ex rel Williams v. Walker, 535 F.2d 383, 386-87 (7th Cir, 1976 ) (''The introduction of perjured testimony without more does not violate the constitutional rights of the accused. It is the knowing and intentional use of such testimony by the prosecuting authorities that is a denial of due process of law."); see also while the introduction of false testimony of low materiality would not be a per se violation of the due process clause, the introduction of false testimony that has a significant chance of affecting the jury's verdict is so fundamentally unfair that it jeopardizes the defendant's due process rights. 34 351 U. S. 986 (1956); Tilghman v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 661, 662 (10th Cir. 1948 ) (stating that "the mere introduction of perjured testimony in the trial of a criminal case is not enough to void the judgment"). Nevertheless, there is some authority suggesting that the mere introduction of false testimony at trial may constitute a denial of due process:
It is well settled that to obtain a conviction by the use of testimony known by the prosecution to be perjured offends due process. While the petition did not allege that the prosecution knew that petitioner's codefendants were lying when they implicated petitioner, the State now knows that the testimony of the only witnesses against petitioner was false. No competent evidence remains to support the conviction. Deprivation of a hearing under these circumstances amounts in my opinion to a denial of due process of law. Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, Black, and Clark, J.J.) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Diecidue, 448 F. Supp. 1011 , 1018 (M.D. Fla. 1978 ) (observing the "strong suggestion in some decisions that the same, less stringent standard of materiality applies whenever perjury is shown regardless of prosecutorial entanglement"); People v. Hilliard, 65 m. App. 3d 642, 382 N.E.2d 441 (1978) ("Known to the state or not, the use of its judicial process to convict and imprison on perjured testimony is a miscarriage of justice which is abhorent to fundamental fairness and as such intolerable."); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982 ) (although basing its decision on the supervisory role of an appellate court and not "feel[ing] the need to reach the constitutional issue," nevertheless stating that the defendant had a "right to be tried, insofar as possible, on the basis of true and correct evidence; to deny him this right is to deny him a fair trial"); Carlson, supra note 7, at 1171, 1176. The leading case advocating due process protection in perjured testimony cases is Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1938) , in which the Sixth Circuit stated: "[T]he fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions" must with equal abhorrence condemn as a travesty a conviction upon perjured testimony if later, but fortunately not too late, its falseness is discovered, and that the state
• .
• is required to afford a corrective judicial process to remedy the alleged wrong, if constitutional rights are not to be impaired. . . . The appellant is not to be sacrificed upon the altar of a formal legalism too literally applied when those who from the beginning sought his life in effect confess error, when impairment of constitutional right may be perceived, and the door to clemency is closed. See also Kelly v. Ragen, 129 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1942 ) (citing Jones with approval); Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 804-05 (C.D. Cal. 1969 ) (also citing Jones with approval); United States ex rel Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382, 390 (N.D. ID. 1949 ) (citing Jones as authority that defendant was deprived of due process of law). But see United States ex rel Williams v. Walker, 535 F.2d 383, 387 (7th Cir. 1976 ) (refusing to apply Jones); Burks v. Egeler, 512 F.2d 221, 229 (6th Cir.) ("unable to approve of the precise language" of Jones "as a continuing guideline"), cert denied, 423 U. S. 937 (1975); Hodge v. Huff, 140 F.2d 686, 688 (D.C. Cir.) (limiting Jones to a narrow set of facts), cert denied, 322 U. S. 733 (1944) . This Note is not in conflict with the weight of the authority to the extent that such authority concludes that the mere introduction of false testimony without more does not violate the rights of the accused. It is the position of this Note that when the introduction offalse testimony rises to a sufficiently high level of materiality, meaning evidence which has a significant chance of affecting the jury, due process rights are implicated. See notes 34, 72-74 infra and accompanying text. Miller, 499 F.2d 736, 743-44 (10th Cir. 1974); Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213 , 1223 (5th Cir. 1974 ) (stating that "the real question is whether the prosecution failed to disclose evidence so material to the guilt or innocence of the accused that he was denied a fair trial") (emphasis in original). In cases involving the inadvertent suppression of evidence [Vol. 83:1925 Even if the probability standard does not result in fundamental unfairness to defendants having a significant chance of a different verdict on retrial, it may violate the rule of fairness implicit in rule 33. The "interest of justice" requires that judicial efficiency be balanced against the need for the "untainted administration of justice." 35 Conviction on the basis of false testimony, especially where there is a signifi.cant chance that the conviction would not have occurred but for the perjury, arguably violates this standard of fairness. The fairness requirement of rule 33 may be invoked without regard to an independent constitutional violation. 36 Third, by needlessly confusing the roles of judge and jury, the Stofsky probability standard threatens the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial. 37 The right to trial by jury means that a jury, not a judge, must make the final determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused. 38 The function of the trial judge is to decide only whether the newly discovered evidence should be submitted to the jury, not what its ultimate weight should be. 39 Because there is "no way for a court to determine that the perjured testimony did not have controlling weight with the jury," when the judge attempts to second-guess by the prosecutor, courts have found due process violations when the evidence rose to such a level of significance that its nondisclosure resulted in fundamental unfairness. 37. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI ("the accused shall enjoy the right to .
•. an impartial jury."), The argument that the probability standard confuses the roles of judge and jury applies to a certain extent to all rule 33 newly discovered evidence cases. The problem is much more serious when false testimony is involved, however, because in false testimony cases it is probable that the resulting trial was in some way substantively "unfair'' to the defendant. In newly discovered evidence cases, on the other hand, the omission may have had a neutral, rather than a negative, impact. Because the false testimony may be presumed to have had a negative impact, and because it is difficult to estimate how much weight the jury gave it, the power of the judge to determine how the jury would have reacted in the absence of the false testimony should be nar- The principal justification for the probability standard is avoidance of needless trials. This, in turn, is said to protect the integrity of the judicial process. 41 But judicial integrity also requires a proper balance between fairness and efficiency. 42 The probability test actually sacrifices judicial integrity by placing a disproportionate emphasis on the finality interest and relegating the goal of ensuring that convictions are based upon truthful testimony to secondary status. 43 In order to preserve the balance between fairness and efficiency, the courts must exercise a higher degree of scrutiny than the probability standard requires for evaluating the effects of false testimony at trial. 44 In the final analysis, neither the Larrison test nor the Stofsky test has been the subject of close scrutiny, and both are demonstrably inadequate standards for retrial. A comprehensive analysis of the circumstances surrounding the false testimony cases is necessary in order to arrive at a more appropriate solution. This analysis is aided by examining the way courts have handled situations related to the false testimony cases.
40. Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927). It could, of course, be argued that the judge must second-guess the jury and thereby usurp its function no matter what standard is used for granting new trials. The problem is, nevertheless, more severe when the probability standard is used. First, the probability test obviously requires the judge to predict how the jury would react with a greater degree of certainty than other standards that would give the dispute back to the jury in borderline cases. Second, because the probability test requires the judge to make the more precise prediction of whether twelve jurors would acquit, it requires more accuracy and creates greater problems of usurpation than does the 
The concept of judicial integrity is illustrated in the court's statement in Jones v. Kentucky:
It is, of course, perfectly true . . . that great and inexcusable delay in the enforcement of the criminal law has been a serious evil of the times and has brought the administration of the criminal laws into disrepute. But we progress little if freeing the administration of justice from one evil we permit it to become enmeshed in a second, and in our effort to achieve promptness go forward with such haste as to close the door upon the "calm spirit of regulated justice." Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 337-38 (6th Cir. 1938 
II. STANDARDS FOR NEW TRIAL IN CONTEXTS RELATED TO THE
FALSE TESTIMONY CASES
Probability of acquittal is well established as the measure of a defendant's motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Courts have also articulated clear standards for retrial in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. The rules governing the granting of retrials in both the prosecutorial misconduct and the newly discovered evidence cases provide important insights into the resolution of the conflict surrounding false testimony. 197, 201-202 (1978) . But see United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3384 (1985) (changing the rule in specific request cases to granting a new trial only if there is a "reasonable probability" that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense the result of the proceeding would have been different). Where no specific request for exculpatory information is made -the situation in Agurs -the Court held that the proper standard to determine constitutional error was whether "the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." 427 U.S. at 112. The Agurs Court claimed that its reasonable doubt standard accurately "describe[d] the test which courts appear to have applied in actual cases," 427 U.S. at 113, and the Court obviously believed that this standard was less strict than that of probable acquittal applied in newly discovered evidence cases. See 427 U.S. at 111. But, as Justice Marshall argued in dissent, the Court's standard imposes on the defendant a burden which is at least as 'severe' as, if not more 'severe' than, the burden he generally faces on a Rule 33 motion. Surely if a judge is able to say that evidence actually creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt in his mind (the Court's standard), he would also conclude that the evidence "probably would have resulted in acquittal" (the general Rule 33 standard). In short, in spite of its own salutary precaution, the Court treats the case in which the prosecutor withholds evidence no differently from the case in which evidence is newly discovered from a neutral source. 427 U.S. at 115-16 (footnote omitted). Actually, the Court and Marshall were in complete agreement in their analyses of the case. They differed only with respect to the correct solution. The majority believed it was adopting a lesser standard of materiality, while Marshall saw it as a higher standard. Similarly, this Note agrees with the majority's analysis in Agurs, but it favors the "significant chance" test offered by Justice Marshall in dissent simply because that test is suppression of evidence is relevant only to witness credibility. 47 In practice, lower courts have interpreted these Supreme Court rulings to mean that a showing of intentional misconduct on the part of the prosecutor "will mandate a virtual automatic reversal of a criminal conviction. " 48 Courts have developed a flexible new trial standard in cases involving prosecutorial negligence. 49 In cases in which the prosecution has inadvertently suppressed evidence favorable to the accused, the courts have almost universally required some intermediate showing of materiality that is higher than the standard of automatic reversal for deliberate suppression, but lower than the probability-of-acquittal standard for the innocent discovery of false testimony. 50 The nature of the showing required to assess the impact of perjury or other newly discovered evidence on a jury depends largely upon the degree of more precise and less susceptible to misinterpretation than the majority's "reasonable doubt" formulation. Marshall not unreasonably saw the Court's rule as "explicitly establish[ing] the judge as the trier of fact with respect to evidence withheld by the prosecution," and thus "usurp[ing] the function of the jury as the trier of fact in a criminal case." 427 U.S. at 117. The standard put forth by Marshall, that there must be "a significant chance that the withheld evidence • . . could have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction," 427 U.S. at 119, was the prevailing standard of materiality used in the federal courts at the time. See notes 60, 73 & 90 infra. In contrasno the reasonable doubt test, the significant chance rule avoids the problem of usurpation by recognizing that "the determination must be in terms of the impact of an item of evidence on the jury." 427 U.S. at 119. See note 92 infra.
A. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases
47. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959 [ Vol. 83:1925 prosecutorial participation. 5 i Courts have articulated three reasons for departing from the traditional probability test in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. The principal concern of the courts, as expounded in United States v. Agurs, 52 is the extent to which the presence of false or perjured testimony and the failure to disclose information related to such testimony "involve[s] a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process."53 A second and related problem is the need to deter prosecutorial malfeasance. The Agurs Court reasoned that if the same standard· were applied in misconduct cases as in other newly discovered evidence cases, "there would be no special significance to the prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice." 54 Finally, the Supreme Court has concluded that the knowing use of false testimony by the prosecution constitutes a denial of the due process right to a fair trial. 55 If the defense requests exculpatory evidence, negligent suppression of this evidence by the prosecutor may violate due process even if she acts in good faith. 56
The reasons justifying lenient treatment of motions for new trial in prosecutorial misconduct cases -particularly in those cases where mere negligence is demonstrated -suggest the application of a similar standard in false testimony cases where misconduct is absent. 57 First, "corruption of justice" is a central concern in all false testimony cases regardless of prosecutorial misconduct, since the introduction of false testimony material to the guilt of the accused subverts the truth-seeking function of the trial process. 58 Indeed, the Agurs court emphasized that it is the presence of perjured testimony, more than the fact of misconduct, that leads to the corruption of the trial process. 59 Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 1975 83, 87 (1963) (holding that when a specific request for the information is made "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused • . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"). 57. Unless clearly specified in the text, when this Note refers to a lenient or strict standard of materiality, it means lenient or strict from the point of view of the defense. In other words, a strict standard of materiality is one that is difficult for the defense to meet whereas a lenient standard is one that is easy for the defense to meet.
See
58. See Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 337 n.1 (6th Cir. 1938) . See also In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945) ("All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth. Therefore it cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial.").
59. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 103-04 (1976) . See also Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. I, 9 (1956) (stating that "the dignity of the United States government will not permit the conviction of any person on tainted testimony"). Mesarosh did not involve a claim of Although there might be no great cause for concern when the false evidence is of such a low level of materiality that it could not reasonably have affected the jury's judgment, when there is at least a significant chance that the jury would not have convicted the defendant but for the false testimony, the correct administration of justice would seem to mandate a new trial. 60 Second, because the threat of automatic reversal is a strong deterrent in prosecutorial misconduct cases, it is possible to lower the standard for new trial in false testimony cases and still retain an incentive for prosecutors to be particularly diligent in their obligation to serve the cause of justice. A :flexible standard of materiality is essential to reach those false testimony cases in which prosecutorial participation in the perjury is difficult or impossible to prove. 61 prosecutorial misconduct, yet the Supreme Court ruled that the fact that a principal government witness had been totally discredited was alone sufficient to mandate a new trial. Although lower courts have attempted to distinguish Mesarosh from other false testimony cases, the distinctions drawn in these later cases are ultimately unpersuasive. Mesarosh has been distinguished on two grounds. First, the witness in Mesarosh had been totally discredited. See United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1979 844-45 (1980) . Indeed, typically the judge will instruct the jury that if certain testimony of a given witness is false, the jury may disregard the entire testimony of that witness. See note 18 supra. The fact that Mesarosh did not involve a rule 33 motion is irrelevant. The cases suggest no reason why it should make a difference that the government rather than the defendant raised the motion, and given that rule 33 motions are evaluated in light of justice rather than due process, it is arguable that the standard for evaluating these motions should be even lower than the one for constitutional claims. The Mesarosh case, however, offers little guidance for determining what standard of materiality is appropriate for granting new trials in false testimony cases. As the Stofsky court noted, Mesarosh itself would not have survived even the probability test. Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 246. But see Krasny, 607 F.2d at 847 (Ely, J., dissenting) (considering application of Larrison test "required by the teachings of Mesarosh v. United States"); Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961 ), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964 (Mesarosh suggests that while there must be some showing of materiality, "very little will do").
60. Courts have utilized the "correct administration of justice" rationale to justify the granting of new trials in negligent nondisclosure cases. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563,571 (2d Cir. 1961 ) (denial of new trial "inconsistent with the correct administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, which it is our duty as an appellate court to supervise"); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1966 ) ("fair administration of criminal justice" mandates new trial in negligent suppression cases if disclosure "might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about appellant's guilt"). A denial of a new trial in inadvertent suppression cases is "inconsistent with the correct administration of justice" only when "there was a significant chance that this added item, developed by skilled counsel as it would have been, could have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction." United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969) . See also United States v. Mayersohn, 452 F.2d 521, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1971); notes 90 & 92 infra. Cf. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 n.9 (Minn. 1982) (employing "correct administration of criminal justice" rationale to justify a "might" standard in false testimony cases).
61. See Carlson, supra note 7, at 1185-87. A looser standard of materiality might also be necessary in order to reach those cases in which the prosecutor is innocent, but the police or [Vol. 83:1925 Even absent demonstrated prosecutorial mis-or malfeasance, there are good reasons to believe that the government has acted with tacit complicity in a false testimony case. In many cases, although the prosecutor has no knowledge of the perjury, she takes action that induces the false testimony. The vast majority of recantation and perjury cases involve situations in which the government has given its witness great incentives to lie. 62 Typically, these witnesses are paid informants or co-conspirators who have been promised something in return for their testimony. 63 Having made convictions easier and false testimony more likely by purchasing the testimony of its witnesses, the other local officials have participated in the perjury. Suppression by the police may be as destructive to the fair administration of criminal justice as suppression by the prosecutor. Id. at 1177-78. Thus, courts have held that the prosecutor should be charged with the knowledge of lower government agents. See, e.g., Barbee v. Warden, 341 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964) Note almost two thirds concerned the testimony of co-conspirators or informant witnesses. Of the 18 cases in which the prosecution did not use these suspect witnesses, 4 involved government agents. The government is certainly responsible for the false testimony of its own agents. In the co-conspirator and paid informant cases, the government is responsible for perjured testimony to the extent that it bought and encouraged such testimony through the promise of lenient treat• ment or monetary reward.
prosecution may be said to have involved itself in the perjury. 64 Lowering the new trial standard in false testimony cases will provide the prosecutor with incentives to elicit only truthtful testimony. In light of the government's tacit involvement, the distinction between false testimony cases and cases involving proven prosecutorial misconduct begins to break down, and the proferred reasons for treating these two types of cases differently may be called into question.
The prosecutorial suppression cases further demonstrate that the goal of deterrence does not require a meaningful distinction between false testimony cases and cases involving prosecutorial negligence. Deterrence is not an important consideration in inadvertent nondisclosure cases. 65 The fact that courts have nevertheless demanded a significant degree of scrutiny in such cases 66 indicates a shift in focus from preventing prosecutorial abuse to protecting the rights of the accused. 67 Finally, the due process rationale for granting new trials in misconduct cases does not disappear in cases involving the unknowing use . of false testimony. Admittedly, the constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence applies only to cases involving prosecutorial participation. 68 If, however, an essential function of due process is to safeguard the rights of the accused, the rationale for recognizing de-64. As one commentator has written: [P]romises of favorable treatment differ fundamentally from other forms of potentially exculpatory or impeaching evidence. The prosecutor, or his agent, discovered the eyewitness, the glass covered with fingerprints, and the evidence reflected in the police report. These items existed independently of the prosecutor's initiative. A promise of favorable treatment, however, exists only because of the prosecutor's deliberate action. The prosecutor, taking advantage of a power conferred on him but denied to the defendant, has himself provided a motive to lie. · A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, supra note 62, at 895. But see Marrs, supra note 62, at 246
(arguing that in the case of accomplice witnesses, "the defendant in effect selected the witnesses against him and, therefore, the defense can hardly blame the Government for the witness' less than laudatory resume"). 65. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968) . The court noted that an important concern in negligent nondisclosure cases was to avoid a rule which "would create unbearable burdens and uncertainties" on the prosecutor. This consideration, however, is unlikely to arise in false testimony cases since the duty of the prosecutor to disclose is by definition limited in scope to a narrow category of evidence that bears upon the veracity of witness testimony.
66. See note 60 supra and notes 87-90 infra. 67. See Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966 Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 142 (1964) , in which the author pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in Brady as evidence of a shifting concern from the conduct of the prosecutor to the prejudicial effect on the defendant. See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) ("If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor."); Moynahan v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139 , 1147 (D. Conn. 1976 .
But see United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 1975 ) (noting that "our cases establish that in cases of deliberate suppression, 'prophylactic considerations,' designed to deter future prosecutorial misconduct are of overriding importance").
68. See note 33 supra.
fondants' due process rights only where prosecutorial misconduct is present is substantially weakened. The Supreme Court has recognized that the principle underlying the suppression of evidence cases "is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." 69 While courts have not entirely abandoned the link to prosecutorial behavior in formulating a standard for new trials in false testimony cases, 70 recent decisions have focused on the defendant's right to a fair trial rather than on the prosecutor's conduct. 71 In cases involving the inadvertent suppression of evidence, where the prevention of misconduct is not an issue, many courts have nevertheless found due process violations if the suppressed evidence rises to a sufficiently high degree of materiality. 72 Generally, these courts have held that fundamental fairness, and hence due process, is denied whenever disclosure of the inadvertently suppressed evidence would lead to a "significant chance" that the defendant could avoid conviction. 73 Because the effect on the accused is the same whether or not the prosecutor knew or should have known of the perjury, an approach that ties the denial of due process to the "character of the evidence" rather than to the "character of the prosecutor" makes good sense. 74 Even if the introduction of false testimony without prosecutorial participation does not violate due process, courts may nevertheless conclude that a federal trial tainted by such testimony is "inconsistent 69. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) .
70. See note 33 supra. 71. See note 67 supra. 72. See note 34 supra. At least one court has argued that a stricter standard of materiality should be imposed when the inadvertently suppressed evidence is impeaching rather than exculpatory. Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271 , 1273 -74 (5th Cir. 1976 ) (standard for exculpatory evidence is "creates a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt which did not otherwise exist"; standard for impeachment evidence is "probably would have resulted in an acquittal"), The Seventh Circuit has also advocated a different standard for false testimony cases when the evidence is purely impeaching in nature. United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95, 99 (7th Cir. 1979) , The Supreme Court, however, rejected any such distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence when it held that the rule in intentional misconduct cases is the same regardless of whether the evidence goes only to witness credibility. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. As Judge Wisdom argued in dissent in Garrison, "[o]ur focus should be on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the state's case against the defendant, not on the type of evidence that the prosecution failed to release." 540 F.2d at 1276 (emphasis in original). See, e.g., Ogden v. Wolff, 522 F.2d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 1975 with the correct administration of criminal justice," which the appellate courts must supervise. 75 Federal courts need not find a constitutional violation before exercising their power to ensure fair trials. 76 Rule 33 itself reflects a policy of "fastidious regard" for the untainted "administration of justice," which must be balanced against the desire for the efficient use of judicial resources. 77
73.
B. The Newly Discovered Evidence Cases
Any argument that a special standard should be applied in false testimony cases must distinguish that class of cases from other cases involving newly discovered evidence. argues that "the prosecutor may be completely innocent of wrongdoing and the defendant nonetheless denied a fair trial due to the impact on the jury of a mistaken or spiteful witness's testimony." [Vol. 83:1925 dence had a negative effect on the jury does not arise; the evidence at trial may have been incomplete, but it was all true. Thus, the false testimony cases raise a fair trial issue not present in the typical rule 33 case. 81 Second, there is a greater risk that the integrity of the judicial process will suffer when tainted testimony is introduced at trial than when new evidence is discovered after trial. 82 When false testimony is introduced, it is likely that something suspicious (and unfair) is going on at trial. The omission of evidence, on the other hand, cann.ot be presumed to have a negative impact on the proceedings.
Third, because the government itself may be at fault in the perjured testimony cases by creating incentives for witnesses to testify falsely, it should bear a greater responsibility to ensure that the conviction was fair. 83 Moreover, a lower standard of materiality in false testimony cases may be necessary in order to reach those cases in which prosecutorial participation is likely to be present but cannot be proven. 84 Finally, the danger of inefficient administration of criminal justice is less compelling in false testimony cases than in newly discovered evidence cases. In the typical rule 33 case the new evidence has not been tried and is thus of unknown reliability. 85 In false testimony cases, however, once a court makes a determination that the testimony was actually false, it is not as difficult to determine the impact on the jury of the false testimony in the first trial. 86 Thus, the risk of needless retrials is not as great as in the newly discovered evidence cases.
Although the distinctions between false testimony and other newly discovered evidence cases are subtle, they do suggest a rationale for a more lenient standard for new trials in cases involving false testimony. False testimony cases differ from other newly discovered evidence cases in that they contain some, but not all, of the characteristics of prosecutorial misconduct cases. 87 Because of these characteristics, a defendant who is convicted in part by the use of perjured testimony should have a better chance at getting a new trial than a defendant who presents some other newly discovered evidence. In the absence of 81. This appears to be the argument that the Seventh Circuit posited in United States v.
Johnson, 149 F.2d 31, 44 (7th Cir. 1945 31, 44 (7th Cir. ), revd., 327 U.S. 106 (1946 . See note 23 supra. See also State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585-86 (Minn. 1982 Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 (Minn. 1982 ). 86. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 (Minn. 1982 . 87. Even assuming that newly discovered evidence cases could not be properly distinguished, if persuasive reasons could be given for a new standard in perjured testimony cases then the implication would be that the standard should perhaps be reevaluated in the newly discovered evidence cases as well.
prosecutorial misconduct, however, a victim of false testimony should not be entitled to a presumption that his conviction was illegitimate. Thus, the standard for new trial should lie somewhere between a rule of automatic reversal and a rule of probability.
III. FORMULATION OF A NEW STANDARD
The underlying problem with the existing standards for a new trial in false testimony cases is the failure to strike a proper balance between the interest in the efficient administration of criminal justice and the interest in safeguarding the rights of the accused. Literal applications of the Larrison test would overburden the system with new trials based upon insubstantial claims. On the other hand, the probability standard will inevitably deny new trials even when the defendant has been treated unfairly. Courts can better accommodate the competing interests in fairness and efficiency by following a course between Larrison and Stofsky. 88 The above analysis of the cases and policy considerations points toward a compromise test. In order to grant a rule 33 motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence of false testimony at trial, the court must be reasonably well satisfied that (a) testimony given by a material witness at trial was false or that the witness has become so thoroughly discredited that the court is unable to determine whether the testimony was true or false; 89 (b) there is a significant chance that a jury with knowledge that the witness testified falsely would return a different verdict; 90 and (c) the defense was taken by 88. Some courts have suggested alternative standards that might ease the tension between the competing interests at stake, but thus far none have been used in false testimony cases. Although the most popular test applied in negligent suppression cases is the significant chance rule delineated at note 60 supra, courts have from time to time suggested a number of different standards. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (where no specific request was made retrial was appropriate if "the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist"); Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154 (1972) (new trial in negligent suppression cases where a specific request for evidence was made if there was "any reasonable likelihood" that disclosure could "have affected the judgment of the jury"); United States v. Harris, 462 F.2d 1033 , 1035 (10th Cir. 1972 ), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 933 (1974 (new trial if the "potential impact upon the result" of the suppression of evidence "was apparent"); Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1966 [ Vol. 83:1925 surprise by the false testimony and was unable to meet it or know of its falsity at the time of the trial. 91 Because a new trial should neither be always required nor always denied in false testimony cases, a balancing approach is essential. But a balancing approach, by its very nature, compromises both the finality and fair trial interests present in situations where false testimony has been given. The "significant chance" rule suggested in this Note is not a panacea, but it is an improvement over both a standard that "might" allow new trials in every case and a standard that would deny new trials to defendants unless they "probably" would have been acquitted. Thus, the "significant chance" rule would at least cure the most glaring defects in the existing tests. 92 First, the "significant chance" rule eliminates the danger of the virtual automatic reversal inherent in the Larrison "might" test. A new trial could not be granted based upon the remote possibility of a different conclusion. Rather, the trial court would have to find a significant chance that the result would be different. Second, the proposed test properly takes into account the impact of the perjured testimony on witness credibility. Third, by providing a standard that is less rigid than either the "might" or the "probability" test, the signifi.cant chance standard allows for more forthright application of the law. 93 Fourth, the test prevents unfair convictions resulting from application of the Stofsky probability test because it allows an accused a new trial whenever he has a signifi.cant chance of avoiding conviction. 94 Fifth, the test better preserves the independent functions of judge and jury by clarifying that the case must go to the jury every time there is a signifi.cant chance of avoiding conviction. Thus, the judge need not usurp the jury's function by guessing what its probable verdict would be. 95 Finally, the test would preserve the prosecutor's incentive to serve the cause of justice by providing an intermediate standard that is less severe than the automatic reversal standard applied in the intentional misconduct cases, yet strong enough to reach those cases in which it is difficult to prove prosecutorial participation.
CONCLUSION
The integrity of the judicial process requires that defendants be accorded a fair trial free from the taint of perjured testimony. But the viability of the system also requires that criminal justice be administered efficiently and that the public have faith in the finality of judgments. Pi;esent standards for the granting of a new trial in false testimony cases have sacrificed judicial integrity in their failure to reconcile these competing interests. The intermediate test presented in this Note offers a viable resolution to this conflict. 
